



THE Cement case of April 1948 deals with the central problem of
politics-the organization, administration, and control of power. On
the surface, the case deals with basing-point prices, and the order of
the Federal Trade Commission in the case requires the Cement Insti-
tute to cease and desist from conspiring to eliminate competition
through private price controls in the marketing of cement. Struggles
over prices, however, are struggles for security and advantage, and
for the power that is at stake if prices move up or down. In the Cenent
case, prices were determined by formulas which left customers no
price basis for choosing between one producer as against another.
Price control was central to the maintenance of what may be described
as a security system, operated for the benefit of the members of the
Cement Institute. Although uniformity of prices is theoretically con-
sistent with either free competition or monopolistic restraint,I the Com-
mission found that the latter was both the object and the necessary
result of the Cement Institute conspiracy. As one of the Institute's
trustees put it in a moment of friendly candor to a colleague in the
cement industry:
"The truth is of course-and there can be no serious, respectable
discussion of our case unless this is acknowledged-that ours is an
industry above all others that cannot stand free competition. that
must systematically restrain competition or be ruined ... ." 2
* The analysis of this paper is based upon the following political propositions: (1) the
principal social values of modem life are realized through group action; (2) groups or-
ganize for security and advantage, to control the environment in which they exist in order
to make it predictable and safe; (3) organization begets counter-organization; (4) coali-
tions, constellations, and combinations of groups struggle with each other for security and
the advantage of their members; (5) the struggle takes place in the official as v.ell as the
private fields of controversy; (6) the distinction between "official" and "private" is the
social understanding that the first have the right to give ImownM and knowable orders to the
second; (7) in the struggle for security and advantage, private groups enlist the support of
official groups in their behalf when the added leverage of official power is required; (8) a
principal function of legislators is to referee the group struggle, to ratify the victories of
successful coalitions, and to record the terms that define the compromises, surrenders and
victories in the form of statutes; (9) legislative votes tend to represent the composition of
strength, i.e., the balance of power, among the contending coalitions at the moment of vot-
ing; (10) what may be called "public policy" is the equilibrium reached at any moment in
the struggle of contending coalitions, an equilibrium which factions of groups constantly
strive to weight in their favor.
' Joseph B. Eastman Professor of Political Science; Chairman, Department of Politi-
cal Science, Amherst College.
1. The Cement Institute et al., 37 F.T.C. 87,251 (1943).
2. Id. at 144.
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Before the Supreme Court decision in April 1948, the Cement Insti-
tute was a private government organized to protect an economic
security system. As such it became a goal of several official groups
which exist or have existed to divert the force of such private govern-
ments away from socially unacceptable objects. Among these groups
are the Federal Trade Commission, the lower federal courts and the
Supreme Court, the Departments of Commerce and Justice, the
Temporary National Economic Committee and the House Select
Committee on Small Business. Although possessed of the advantage
of officiality, these agencies have suffered from grave weakness in
dealing with organized structures like the Cement Institute. Indus-
trial groups possess unity of command and community of purpose and
interest. They can be deployed in full vigor against the separated
agencies and branches of officialdom, which are often at war with each
other. At no time have all of the resources of formal government been
fully coordinated in a single striking force against the concentrations
of monopoly power organized in the many systems of private govern-
ment that inhabit the economy. Either Congress has failed to give
the Department of Justice sufficient appropriations, or judges have
countermanded Commission orders, or committees have made solemn
recommendations which have gone unheeded by Congressmen and
Presidents. It took over ten years before the Commission and the
Supreme Court succeeded in combining their forces to declare the
cement combination unlawful.
The Cement case of 1948 is a. stage in the struggle of monopoly to
dominate and exploit its environment for the security and advantage
of its members. The Supreme Court decision represents a temporary
victory of official power over a centrally organized system of private
government. The struggle is continuous and will not end with the
Supreme Court decision. In fact the Supreme Court decision may be
regarded most clearly as only one level of compromise in a never end-
ing series of compromises and adaptations, armistices and adjustments,
Immediately after the Cement case the cement and steel industries
began to rally fresh groups to their support to revise or overrule the
Supreme Court decision.
This essay will concern the political nature of the Cement Institute,
some aspects of the politics of revision, and the control of concentra-
tions of private power.
I. THE POLITICS OF BASING POINTS
The Cement Confederation
A system of private government, the Cement Institute in organiza-
tion and structure most closely resembled a confederation. It was a
union of virtually all of the manufacturers of cement in the United
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States. Constituent corporations were semi-autonomous in the man-
agement of their respective enterprises. But they were limited in their
choice of business policies by their compliance, willing or forced, with
the rules administered by the central organization in behalf of all. -3
The central organization of the confederation had its officers, trustees,
committees, divisions, bureaus and other agents, including field repre-
sentatives-all performing governmental functions. 4
The executive authority was vested in the president, vice-president
and treasurer, and the legislative authority was vested in the trustees.
Taxes were laid on the members of the confederation by the central
body, and each member had to continue these payments for a year
after resignation from the Institute.3 This pecuniary penalty for with-
drawal was one of the methods used to keep the confederation intact.
Like the federal union in the United States, the Cement Institute
came into being only after inferior forms had been tried and found
wanting. One of the earlier organizations-and later one of the largest
sub-groups within the Institute-was the Portland Cement Associa-
tion, known from 1902 until 1916 as the American Portland Cement
Manufacturers." It was succeeded by the Cement Manufacturers
Protective Association. The main function of this association was to
compile and circulate statistics about costs, prices, freight rates and
distribution channels. The U.S. Department of Justice decided that
what the association was really trying to do was to control and make
uniform the prices of cement. But the Supreme Court, in dismissing
the Justice Department's suit, said there was insufficient evidence to
that effect and that the Association had not succeeded in getting price
uniformity.7 Apparently the cement industry was also well aware of
this latter fact. The Cement Institute was organized in 1929 as a
device for the more efficient control of the industry after the two pre-
vious arrangements had failed.
As the articles of association said, one of the purposes of the Institute
was "[t]o adopt and promulgate a Code of Ethics for the govrnment of
its members . . . [and] to establish and maintain all such lawful trade
customs and usages for the protection of the members as the Institute
may deem advisable." 8 In 1933, this private government was given
virtually official status when the Trade Practice Committee of the
Cement Institute became the Code Authority for the industry under
3. A principal method of coercion was economic loss. See 37 F.T.C. 179 (1943).
4. Id. at 125.
5. Id. at 126.
6. Id. at 143.
7. Cement Manufacturers' Protective Association v. United States, 26 U.S. 5S3
(1925).
8. 37 F.T.C. 87, 157 (1943).
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the NIRA.9 When the NIRA was invalidated in the Schechter case of
1935, the Trade Practice Committee for seven months thereafter con-
tinued to administer some of the provisions of the Code.
The relative ease in transition, from private to public status and
back again, illustrates the purely formal nature of the terms "official"
and "unofficial." During the whole NRA period, for example, the
multiple basing-point price system prevailed despite objections before
the Consumers Advisory Board 10 and despite the efforts of state and
federal agencies to purchase f.o.b." The basing-point system pre-
vailed before and after NRA as well. But it was only one of many
devices employed by the cement industry to establish a security
system.
.Devices of Control
Cement has been manufactured in the United States for a period of
some seventy years, having been imported before that time. With the
appearance of the industry, the movement for control soon followed.
Three principal control devices have been utilized for the purpose of
producing uniformity of price-patent control, dissemination of price
and cost data, and the administration of a formulary price system
through the Cement Institute. The use of these principal methods of
control correspond with fairly well defined periods in the history of the
industry. The patent control period lasted from 1900 to 1911. Two
employees of the Atlas Portland Cement Company, the Messrs. Hurry
and Seaman, secured a patent on a method of burning powdered coal
in rotary cement kilns.12 From this beginning there developed a sys-
tem of price manipulation through licensing agreements which col-
lapsed in 1911 after a court decision adverse to the validity of the
Hurry and Seaman patents. The next principal method of control was
the dissemination of statistical information through the Cement Manu-
facturers Protective Association. As indicated previously, this was
not enough to keep everyone in line.
The third and most effective system of control was that applied by
the Cement Institute. The focal point of control was multiple basing-
point pricing. Under this system, sixty basing-points were established
in the United States, each with its base price for cement. In calculating
the delivered price for cement for any customer, the seller had first to
decide which basing-point governed. This was done by adding to the
price maintained at all basing-points near the customer, the all-freight
rail charge from each of the basing-points to the customer. The small-
est sum of these factors (basing-point price plus rail charge) was the
9. Id. at 159.
10. Id. at 158.
11. Id. at 160.
12. Id. at 153.
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price at which any producer would sell to the customer. Every seller
of cement in the United States would sell to a given customer, there-
fore, at the same price.
In order to enable any seller to make this simple arithmetical calcula-
tion it was necessary for all of them to know the location of the basing-
points, the basing-point prices, and the freight rates.1 3 The information
as to freight rates was supplied by the freight bureau of the Cement
Institute in the form of freight rate books. These rates are fixed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission and by state regulatory bodies,
and are distressingly complex. Control of the location of basing-points
and of the basing-point prices was in the hands of the Institute, but
control of the basic freight rates was not. In cases of conflict betveen
the published rates of the ICC and those set out in the freight rate
books distributed by the Institute the members of the industry were
disciplined to conform to the Institute's figures. When the ICC, for
example, changed a rate, the members of the cement industry con-
tinued to calculate their delivered prices at the old freight rates until
they were told by the Institute that they could calculate them at the
new rates. 14 They were permitted to calculate them at the new rates
when the Cement Institute had had time to prepare its new rate books.
Thus the edict of private authority superseded that of public authority
in an area where the latter was presumed to possess overriding control.
It was in effect an arrogation by the Cement Institute to itself of the
power of public authority to determine the rules by which industry
was to be governed. It is an especially good example of what Beardsley
Ruml describes as the rule-making function of private business groups.
But it takes more than promulgation to make a rule stick. The Cement
Institute had to indulge in a wide variety of activities to make the
industry secure.
Security by Force
The most obvious aspect of the security system was the multiple
basing-point delivered price. But as in the execution of its programs
and policies by public government, the system of private government
represented by the Cement Institute had to devise and administer
numerous corollary, supporting, and protective activities to perfect
the central point of control. Divisionist influences had to be fought off
so that the members of the confederation might continue to exist in
domestic tranquillity and non-competitive amity. The Cement In-
stitute lived in an environment of groups potentially hostile to it and
to the basing-point system. Security in this environment made it
necessary to neutralize these outside pressures. Among the potentially
13. Id. at 103.
14. Id. at 109.
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hostile groups in the universe in which the Cement Institute dwelt
were truckers, dealers, customers, foreign importers, and state and
federal agencies.
Truckers. Customers frequently would want to truck their cement
from the plant of the manufacturer to destination. Such a practice
breaks the basing-point formula by changing the freight rate factor.
In fact, if the buyer were permitted to take delivery at the mill and
transport by truck, the seller lost control of the delivered price.'" After
an initial period of some ten years after the First World War, during
which the cement industry tolerated a certain amount of such buying,
the industry, by cooperation, understandings and agreements among
themselves began systematically to discourage the practice. It is in-
teresting that this policy coincided with the appearance of the Cement
Institute and is another indication that the Institute was a superior
form of private government, much more efficient than the arrange-
ments that had previously existed, for protecting the security system
of the cement manufacturers. Various restrictive steps were taken to
discourage trucking by customers, including the imposition of penalties
in the form of a fifteen cents a barrel surcharge paid only by those ask-
ing delivery to trucks."6 There were several regional variations of the
penalty price discrimination.' 7 By 1932 a major part of the cement
manufacturing industry had declined to permit trucking under any
circumstances, and most of the rest forced buyers to pay penalty prices
for delivery by trucks.'
Dealers. A second group of potential hostiles in the environment of
the cement manufacturers was the body of dealers, who purchase a
substantial percentage of all cement sold.1" Irregularities (in price or
otherwise) in the sale of cement by dealers tended to disturb the secu-
rity system of the cement manufacturers, and various policies were
employed to neutralize this dangerous influence. Before 1913 no dis-
counts were given to dealers by Lehigh, one of the principal producers
of cement, but for the next eighteen years some form of dealer differen-
tial was maintained.2" Eventually the discount was ten cents a barrel.
It proved to be a source of weakness in the security system of the man-
ufacturers. Some dealers, for example, in order to get attractive car-
load business, sold to consumers on a five cents margin. They were
15. Id. at 191.
16. Id. at 192.
17. Id. at 193.
18. Id. at 198. Although the manufacturers combined to prevent customers from tak-
ing delivery f.o.b. trucks, the manufacturers frequently employed trucks for delivery whilo
charging the all-rail freight rate. Id. at 114.
19. Id. at 141.
20. Id. at 226.
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thus able to quote the manufacturer's product to the consumer at less
than the manufacturer's price to the consumer.
21
The Institute therefore abandoned the trade discount to dealers but
then found it necessary to devise other methods for controlling the
competition between dealers and manufacturers and among dealers.
This was done by making the dealers the exclusive outlets for cement
in dealer markets, with certain exceptions. Manufacturers reserved
the right to sell directly to the federal and state governments, railroads,
and certain users employing cement for the manufacture of cement
products, but not for resale in bulk. 22 This rationalization of the
market was written into the Code for the Cement Industry in 1933,
but it was set aside in 1934. Defeated in the attempt to write these
restrictions into law, the Institute reached the same result by declara-
tions of policy to which the customers of cement were expected to
adapt themselves. That they did so is shown by the correspondence
gathered by the Federal Trade Commission from the National Federa-
tion of Building Supply Associations, Southwestern Lumbermen's
Association, Nebraska Lumber Merchants Association, and the Moun-
tain States Lumber Dealers Association.2 3 Arrangements were also
made to maintain uniform compliance with the new policy by the
designation of a "contact" man between the Institute and the National
Federation of Building Supply Associations to police the new rule and
to report violations of it.24 This is a good example of the manner in
which the Cement Institute as a system of private government put
into effect a rule of conduct which not only differed from the rule of
public authorities but violated it.
The Dealer Policy of 1935 reserved to the manufacturer the right
to make sales to the Federal Government but the right was not preclu-
sive. In fact the dealers were made the exclusive channel for sales to
unemployment and relief agencies like the Works Progress Adminis-
tration, Civilian Conservation Corps, and Federal Emergency Relief
Administration. All sales through dealers carried the dealer's mark-up.
The result was a tax imposed upon the people of the countr3, by the
Cement Institute for the benefit of the dealers and the maintenance of
the cement manufacturers' security system .
2
1
Customers. A third, and the most numerous, group dwelling in the
environment of the cement confederation was the heterogeneous group
of customers. Since their behavior as customers could threaten the
security system with disorder, it was thought necessary to organize,
classify, and rationalize this behavior. It had to be made safe and
21. Id. at 227.
22. Id. at 228.
23. Id. at 230.
24. Id. at 231.
25. Id. at 232-3.
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predictable to the confederation. Many strategems were employed to
accomplish this object. Customers, motivated by the same desire for
security and advantage as the Institute and its members, sought to
free themselves from the iron grip of a rigid price system by making
long-term contracts with dealers at the price determined at the time
of the contract. The purpose of these contracts was to insure the cus-
tomer against increases in price decreed by the manufacturers. In
effect it was an engagement by dealers to absorb such increases in
return for the advantage of a long-term order. A variation of this prac-
tice was for customers to order cement from a number of sources for
the same job, stockpiling this commodity as an insurance against price
increases.26 The Institute met this subterfuge by collecting and dis-
seminating information about specific job contracts. This information
quickly showed which customers were placing orders beyond the needs
of specific jobs on hand, both in quantity and length of contract.
27
The Institute did not leave it to the individual action of its members
to control this practice, however. Collective action and the pressure of
collective opinion were brought to bear upon members of the Institute
to cancel the contracts violating or threatening the security system.
21
In all of this politicking, the Institute took pains to make it appear
that the checking and cancelling of contracts was a matter of individual
action.2 19 For example, the Institute supplied daily summaries of con-
tracts and cancellations to the members of the Institute, but declined
to send such information directly to the field representatives of mem-
bers of the Institute. The Institute in a letter to one of its members
explained this refusal on the ground that it wanted to avoid "the im-
plication that the Cement Institute has any authority in the control of
contract obligations." 3o
Customers also evolved a method of evading quoted delivered
prices. If the quoted price to a point beyond the customer's own loca-
tion was higher by an amount less than actual freight, he would order
the cement to be delivered to the more distant point. Then while the
goods were in transit, the customer would have them diverted to the
proper destination. The freight charge would be less than that assumed
in the manufacturer's quoted price, and the customer would thus save
at the seller's expense. By means of understandings and agreements,
the Institute sought to prevent purchasers from engaging in this highly
"unethical" practice of diversion in transit.3'
The practice of diversion was castigated in the Code for the Cement
26. Id. at 202.
27. Id. at 203.
28. Id. at 204.
29. Id. at 206.
30. Ibid.
31. Id. at 199.
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Industry in 1933 as an unfair trade practice. It had previously been
asserted to be a venal practice in the Code of Ethics adopted by the
cement manufacturers when the Cement Institute was established in
1929. After the expiration of the NIRA, the trustees of the Institute
drew up a "Compendium of Established Terms and Marketing Meth-
ods" which also characterized the diversion of freight as an unfair
method of competition. The Compendium recommended the use of a
standard contract form which required the purchaser to pay the full
original price if the freight were diverted in transit.
In disciplining and chastising purchasers of cement, the Cement In-
stitute was able to enlist the cooperation of the railroads. The traffic
advisory committee of the Association of American Railroads was in-
duced to recommend to its members that they accept bills of lading
stamped with a clause prohibiting diversion. These bills of lading were
used by many of the members of the Institute. 32 After 1937, the mem-
bers of the Institute began to pre-pay the freight charges for cement.
As the Federal Trade Commission concluded, "When freight is pre-
paid, there can be no diversion of shipments by the consignee to his
advantage in price." 33
Official agencies. A fourth group constituting a threat to the security
system of the cement manufacturers was the complex of federal and
state purchasing agencies. There is no evidence that the members of
the Cement Institute at any time were impressed by the character of
federal and state agencies as organs of government, possessors in some
small part of the sovereign power of the people, the supreme political
power of an organized community. The evidence tends rather to show
that the members of the Cement Institute regarded agencies of the
federal and state governments as just another group of individuals,
not too scrupulous, seized of certain unfair privileges in dealing with
non-official groups, a fat source of profit, but not entitled to any better
treatment from the members of the Institute than any other customer,
and certainly not entitled to preferences merely because they hap-
pened to be serving public policy for the whole nation. The Institute
insisted on treating the members of governmental agencies like all
customers in the grip of the confederation, but complained loudly when
the members of the Institute were treated by governmental agencies on
the same cold-blooded basis of profit.
For example, as part of its policy to fix high prices and to ration low
production, the cement confederation undertook to discourage the
entry of new producers into the cement industry. When the Tennessee
Valley Authority was established, it required millions of barrels of
cement for construction work. It called for bids on cement and re-
32. Id. at 201.
33. Id. at 202.
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ceived such bids from members of the Cement Institute, all of them
substantially identical. Thereupon TVA made a study to determine
the practicability of building and operating its own cement plant.
Representations were made to the TVA by members and officers of
the Institute, after which the TVA decided to make a joint examination
of costs to determine a fair price for cement. It also decided that if
bids received were not reasonable in terms of these findings, it would
make some move to build its own plants. The threat, accompanied by
an ultimatum, guarded but firm, produced the desired result. A com-
promise price was agreed upon and TVA purchased its cement.34
Although the Institute had no qualms about charging a monopoly
price, and no scruple about insisting that the TVA "take it or leave
it," it was with the sharpest cries of pain and self-pity that it received
the TVA ultimatum. In a long, ill-tempered telegram to the Chairman
of TVA, one of the trustees of the Institute employed such phrases as
"prejudice against businessmen," "to coerce the companies," "arbi-
trary power," "immense power," "control of vast government funds,"
"ruthless declaration," "arbitrary determination," "under threat of
dire punishment," and so on.35 The Cement Institute was not a happy
contributor to the reconstruction of the Tennessee Valley.
The somewhat cynical conception of governmental agencies as a
group of enterprisers to be overreached if possible, was implicit in the
classification and division of customers between manufacturers and
dealers, of which note has already been made. When the dealer ar-
rangement was established as an Institute policy, it was thought to be
desirable to maintain close liaison with federal purchasing officials to
make sure that the Institute view was properly presented. The rep-
resentatives of the Cement Institute did their work well and persuaded
the military men who were in the Procurement Division that it was in
the public interest to buy through dealers at a higher price than by
direct purchase from manufacturers at a lower price."c The secretary
of the National Federation of Builders Supply Associations was jubi-
lant over the victory as he confided in a letter of August 28, 1935:
"There were those who said 'it couldn't be done.' To them it
seemed a hopeless task to buck a Department of the Government
which was determined to buy direct. However it has been done
and, in my judgment, it is conservative to say that in excess of
$50,000,000 of business will be held in dealer channels which .
would certainly have gone direct.
"Instead of disaster which seemed to be certainly headed in
our direction, we have been able to gain a signal victory. We have
34. Id. at 223-5.
35. Id. at 224.
36. Id. at 233.
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proved to the Government, to manufacturers, and to ourselves
that we are alive and willing to fight for our rights. More than
10,000 communications went into Washington, I am informed,
either directly to members of Congress or to the Procurement
Division. . . ."
This "signal victory" helped to swell the cost of government about
which business groups as taxpayers are so solicitous.
In the struggle to overreach governmental agencies, one situation
continued to baffle the Cement Institute. This was the method of
making bids for federal purchases of cement to be carried over rail-
roads to which the Federal Government paid land-grant rates.
The now-extinct land-grant rates were less than ICC rates, and were
not published. The basing-point delivered price formula employed by
the members of the Cement Institute required for its successful opera-
tion an exact knowledge of the freight rates between basing-points and
any point of destination. Since the rates that govern the carrying of
federal freight under the land grant discount were not generally knovm,
one indispensable element of the pricing formula was missing.
Under the Code for the Cement Industry, members of the Cement
Institute filed destination prices with the Code Authority which were
then disseminated. It was then possible for each of the member com-
panies to know in advance what each of his fellow members would
charge the Federal Government so that it was possible to achieve un-
iformity in the bidding, even though the bids did not represent the
calculation that might have been made had the freight rates been
known. After the abolition of the Codes, the Institute began a system-
atic search for land-grant rates, a search akin to the espionage activities
familiar in foreign relations, with a vigorous underground and a central
intelligence headquarters. The Cement Institute sought to piece
together information about land-grant rates from a variety of sources-
the railroads themselves, previous lettings, and from competitors. 3
The search was given up after a year or so of operation, and the problem
of land-grant rates continued to be a baffling one.-!
Strangers. New domestic producers and importations of foreign
cement constituted a fifth threat to the security system of the cement
industry. Attacks were therefore made upon new producers and upon
foreign importations of cement. The Code for the Cement Industry in
1933 contained a provision permitting the Institute to petition the
President of the United States to prohibit the establishment of new
plants, increases in the capacity of existing plants, and even the moving
of an existing plant from one location to another." The hostility to
37. Id. at 234.
3S. Id. at 168.
39. Id. at 173.
40. Id. at 219.
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increases of production that would disturb the security system of the
existing members of the Institute led it to protest the granting of loans
by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to units of industries
already in a state of excess capacity of production.4 The strategy of
opposition to this "harmful practice" of the RFC, as it was called,
included the use by private persons of the letter-head of the NRA
Code Authority for the Cement Industry, 42 the solicitation of letters of
protest, and help to a writer for the Chicago Herald and Examiner in
the preparation of an article in support of the cement industry, titled,
"Wasted Taxes." 41 In view of the Institute's insistence that agencies
of the Federal Government pay the dealers' mark-up for cement, the
Institute was in a position to counsel the newspaper writer with an
expert knowledge of his subject. The plant which was the particular
object of the Institute's attention was not put into operation, although
the Institute, in other respects, was not always as successful in crush-
ing incipient competition. 4
Different situations called for different methods in repelling the
appearance of new groups threatening the security system, and in
defeating those who managed to gain entry. The appearance of im-
ported cement in the American market was the signal for concerted
attacks upon dealers and others who handled it. The industry utilized
the techniques of espionage, encirclement, systematic price under-
cutting, boycotts, and reprisals."
Security by Propaganda
Like public governments, and like many other systems of private
government, the cement confederation maintained a ministry of in-
formation and propaganda, a Committee on Public Relations. When
the price of cement went up in 1933 in the face of continuing depression,
there were many protests against the cement industry from both
public and private sources.4 The Institute and its members thereupon
engaged in a concerted and systematic campaign of propaganda to
allay the criticism and put to sleep the hostility. This was difficult,
as some of the members of the Institute admitted, because it was hard
to defend the industry without defending its most characteristic policy
-that competition should be stifled. The sense of grievance that the
industry should be required to defend itself is manifest in the comments
that a midwestern governor had acted-in "a rather unfriendly and un-
41. Id. at 220.
42. Ibid.
43. Id. at 222.
44. Id. at 223.
45. Id. at 235-6.
46. Id. at 239.
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justified manner"; 41 that certain editors "who should be friendly feel
that we are gouging" ;4 and that the "cement business is in public
disfavor." To counteract this public disfavor, to neutralize the grow-
ing acidity of the environment which it had to keep bland, the
Institute put on a campaign with the usual appurtenances of a pro-
motional drive familiar in the advertising world.41
One aspect of this campaign is especially noteworthy because it
exhibits a cold political calculation of the strength of the opposition to
be quieted or appeased. This was a table of the "Approximate Number
of Leaders of Groups to be Convinced," of which twelve groups were
listed . 0 The first five groups covered officialdom and the press, as fol-
lows: (1) federal and state officials; (2) newspapers, magazines and
journals, general and economic writers, financial editors and writers;
(3) United States senators and representatives; (4) state senators and
representatives; (5) county- commissioners and engineers, mayors and
city managers, and city engineers. The Institute calculated that the
apparatus of the public government and the media of mass communica-
tions were the first and most important of the centers of potential re-
sistance and hostility that had to be taken. The experience of under-
ground movements in Europe would seem to confirm the shrewdness
of this calculation.
Behind this first rank of five groups came seven others, representing
the principal structures of interest in the immediate business milieu of
the cement industry. These were (1) building materials dealers; (2)
civic leaders and financiers; (3) contractors; (4) manufacturers of con-
crete products; (5) civil engineers and architects; (6) cooperating or-
ganizations; and (7) othe& industries, like the steel industry, having
the common problem of basing-points and monopolies to defend. These
tables of the organization of the opposition listed the number of leaders
to be persuaded over to the side of the cement industry. The entire
calculation is of interest politically, because it is based on the assump-
tion that the significant political form is the group, and that within the
group there is a leader-follower relation which can be exploited. Cap-
ture the leaders and the followers will not be troublesome.
Creating Internal Unity
This analysis of the politics of the Cement Institute may be con-
cluded with some brief observations about the devices used by the
Institute to create and maintain a community of interest among the
members. The elements of governance in private as well as public
47. Id. at 240.
48. Id. at 241.
49. Id. at 244-5.
50. Id. at 246.
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systems are constraint and consent. Community interest is cultivated
by use of the carrot and the cudgel. Since consent is a perishable good,
the managers of governmental systems must be able to count upon its
constant renewal. If it is not constantly renewed as a by-product of
policies that keep the constituent members happy, consent must be
manufactured. The private government of the Cement Institute was
aware of these problems of rulership and pursued courses pointing to
the following objects: belief in the equality of the constituent mem-
bers; belief in the existence of a community of interest among the
members; and the development of a group morality.
Equality. The policies of the Cement Institute were designed to
confront the customers with an industry in which there was no valid
economic basis for choosing one manufacturer as against another. The
Institute enforced this doctrine of equality by asserting the official
line that cement was a fungible product, and that there were no sub-
stantial qualitative differences. To be sure there were grades of quality
but no differences within these categories."' The result of this policy
was to destroy brand preferences and quality competition. The com-
petition among the manufacturers took place on the level of social
diversion. As the president of the Lone Star said, the scramble for
business uses weapons "wrought from influences which have nothing
to do with the product or the merits of the manufacturer's proposi-
tion." 52 The claim that all portland cement is the same not only
served as an instrument of price control but also served the political
purpose of establishing a confederation of constituents of equal rank.
Equality of rank in a confederation is not indispensable to its continued
existence, but it helps.
Community of interest. Belief in the existence of a community of
interest among the members was promoted by the assertion that the
industry could not stand competition. Divided, all stood a chance of
loss. United, all stood a chance of gain. The world which the Institute
conjured for its members was one in which the cement industry was
encircled by a ring of hostile groups. The security of the members
consisted in their adherence to each other in a common front against
this danger to their well being. This is the tactic familiar in the foreign
policies of public governments, and is a well tested device for main-
taining internal controls. The threat of foreign invasion goes far to
convince the domestic members of a federation that they must stay
together.
Group morality. The belief in a community of interest established a
foundation for the development of a group morality, a pattern of right
and wrong, a structure of values in behavior to insure survival. This
51. Id. at 237.
52. Id. at 238.
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morality was not necessarily the morality of the outgroup universe,
since the outgroup universe did not assume the self-preservation of the
ingroup as the highest goal, as the Cement Institute did. The internal
code of morality was functionally connected with the preservation of
the group. A "code of ethics" was created by the Institute shortly
after its establishment in 1929, and this code became the basis of much
of the NRA Code for the cement industry. When this occurred, the
private code became the public law for the group, theoretically en-
forceable by public authority as well as by the discipline of the private
group. When the NRA died, the Institute continued to exert control
that was little less effective, until the FTC finally caught up with it
in the Cement case of 1948. 33 This setback turned the efforts of the
cement industry-and of a host of enterprises similarly situated-to-
ward revision of the troublesome antitrust laws.
II. THE POLITICS OF RwEVISION
It had been no mean job for the Cement Institute to keep its security
system from falling apart at the seams. It took vigilance, ingenuity
and persistent effort to keep errant members in line and to counter the
pressures of outside antagonists. Perhaps this is the main explanation
for the dismay that greeted the adverse decision of the Supreme Court.
For in banning concerted use of a basing-point price formula, the Court
took away a practice that had become central to the whole security
plan of the cement and other industries. Having found the Court an
unfriendly forum, these industries commenced a fabulous campaign to
revise the law itself.
The steel industry abandoned its basing-point system of pricing and
moved to f.o.b. mill in July 1948. Viewed politically, this action was
a move to create resentment among the customers of steel against the
Federal Trade Commission, and thereby to organize a combination of
disaffected groups capable of getting Congress to override the decision
of the Supreme Court. This is a form of economic pressure, and there-
fore of power applied, to revise the law in favor of those who were
defeated in the Supreme Court. The chorus of protest against the
Cement case thus is made to appear to come from small customers of
the big combinations, and not from the big combinations. So far as
the big combinations are concerned, they are performing the highly
moral act of complying with the law. The chief stage for the protesting
chorus for eight months after the Cement case was the United States
Committee on Trade Policies, and the choirmaster was Senator Homer
E. Capehart of Indiana.
In November and December 1948, the sub-committee heard over
a hundred witnesses on the need for revising the basic law with respect
53. For a detailed analysis of the Cement case of 1948, see 53 Ymm L. J. 426 infra.
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to pricing, as now interpreted by the Supreme Court. It seemed to be
forgotten that the Court had done little more than outlaw a more or
less obvious price-fixing combination. The major theme of the attack
on the Cement case was sounded by the general counsel of the Senate
Trade Policies Committee before the annual meeting of the Grocery
Manufacturers of America. 5 4 Congress, it was said, must determine the
pricing system to be used by industry and clarify the law which is now
confused: if the law means only that uniform delivered prices achieved
by combination and conspiracy are outlawed, it was argued, there is
no occasion for general concern in industry, but it is not now clear,
however, whether freight absorption without conspiracy is unlawful.
A host of witnesses marched past the Senate Trade Policies Committee
voicing variations of this central theme. Among the groups and groups
of groups making appearances were the Great Western Sugar Company
of Denver, the Amalgamated Sugar Company of Odgen, Utah, Mon-
tana-Wyoming Beet Growers Association of Worland, Wyoming,
United Cement, Lime and Gypsum Workers International Union,
National Small Business Men's Association, Associated General Con-
tractors of America, Bridgeport Brass Company, and other companies.
Witnesses for these organizations are only a sample of the diversity of
groups whose views were voiced. Even the principal supply officers of
the Army and the Navy were brought forward to testify in favor of
freight absorption and freight equalization arrangements." To add to
the bustle of activity generated by the Cement case, the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania advertised the industrial advantages and virtues of
Pennsylvania in case the f.o.b. mill pricing system makes "it necessary
for you to have a plant in Pennsylvania." 16
The campaign is not likely to succeed. Yet the most significant
aspect of the politics of revision is not the method employed by pressur-
ing groups, but the strength of their position. Even if these private
governments lose the battle over basing-points, the foundation for
monopolistic security systems will still be there. The industries need
only to find substitutes for the basing-point device, and as the Supreme
Court has remarked: "There is no limit to human inventiveness in this
field."
III. THE CONTROL OF POWER
This discussion of the governmental nature of organized private
groups may have communicated some sense of the process involved in
regulation of monopolies. The process is a never-ending one of thrust
and parry among corporations, enforcement agencies, legislators and
54. N. Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1948, p. 45, col. 3.
55. N. Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1948, p. 41, col. 1.
56. N. Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1948, p. E7, col. 1.
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courts. So far the struggle has not moved a great distance in favor of
either regulators or the regulated.
While it cannot be concluded that monopoly is more widespread
than in the past, neither can it be said that competition has gained.
The antitrust laws have been effective largely in a negative sort of way.
Aside from occasional dissolution of overgrown firms, antitrust policy
has been principally designed to keep monopolistic combinations within
bounds, and it has not always been successful in that. At any rate,
tremendous concentrations of economic power still exist, and they are
far from inactive. Some of our billion dollar corporations exceed many
states in their power and breadth of control. They are systems of
private government that operate within the territory of public govern-
ment. But unlike public authority, they are beholden to no electorate
and responsible to no constituency save their own. And no classical
"free market" exists to conform their economic decisions to the dictates
of general welfare.
One of our difficulties is that we have not had a consistent antitrust
policy, or applied adequate sanctions. We have tended half-heartedly
at some times and in full earnestness at other times to make the Popu-
list antitrust policy effective. This policy hoped to "make little ones
out of big ones," and was primarily anti-industrial in its bias and moti-
vation. Moreover, it was conceived at a time when men thought they
could reverse a development that was then only in its beginnings. The
development is no longer in its beginnings. In its early formulation,
the antitrust problem was regarded as a moral one. The trusts were to
be busted because they were wicked and greedy, not because they were
big. We have not succeeded in enforcing the prejudices of our grand-
fathers. We need to formulate a policy of our own. The form and color
of that policy will depend upon the choices we make as to what we want
to do. What we have to do can then more readily be determined.
In its essence the problem of controlling giantism in the economic
community is a political one; that is, it concerns the control of power.
But words alone do not control power. Power controls power and if
control is to succeed, the force we exert must at least equal the force we
oppose. We have not yet exerted a force equal to the force we say we
oppose. This is because we, as a people, have not really decided that
we mean seriously to oppose giantism. Giantism can be controlled when
the people and their representatives make up their minds to control it.
The disarmament of these private empires does not outspeed the in-
vention of new economic weapons. We lack a clear resolution to meet
private power with at least an equivalent measure of official power.
Up to this time public officials have been overmatched in an unequal
contest.
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As an autonomous student publication, the YALE LAW JOURNAL has
traditionally sought to provide a medium for critical discussion on
current legal issues. Recognizing that views may be as variant as
writers, the JOURNAL has in the past on particularly controversial sub-
jects endeavored to present differing opinions, not to choose among
them. It was in this tradition that the JOURNAL undertook to treat
the currently controversial subject of loyalty among government
employees. 0
Accordingly, the JOURNAL arranged to publish a discussion of this
problem by Messrs. Thomas I. Emerson and David M. Helfeld, and by
General William J. Donovan. The Emerson-Helfeld article appeared
in the December issue.
Before the planned treatment of the loyalty problem could be coin-
pleted by publication of General Donovan's article, however, Mr. J.
Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, wrote to
the editors of the JOURNAL, vigorously criticizing the opinions expressed
by Messrs. Emerson and Helfeld. In view of the public significance of
this statement by a government official directly concerned with the
issue under debate, it is printed here in full, together with a reply by
the original authors and a rejoinder by Mr. Hoover. The JOURNAL
regrets that its publication deadline requires termination of the ex-
change at this point.
Insofar as Mr. Hoover's statement offers facts and opinions on the
subject of loyalty among government employees, it is welcomed as a
contribution to the process of free discussion upon which the JOURNAL
must depend. Insofar as it suggests, however, that publication of the
original article reflects partisanship on the part of the JOURNAL, or, on
the other hand, that the partisanship ascribed to the article should
have disqualified it from publication in the JOURNAL, the editors must
dissent.
The Editors
